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COURT REPORTS

that were once a part of Lake Memphremagog. It discovered, through
a prospective purchaser's tide search in 1969, the Vermont Water
Resources Board ("Board") had required a former owner to dredge a
portion of the lake bottom, and use it as fill for a Newport city
boathouse. The Board stated the order did not convey any tide or
interest to the landfill or to lands lying under public waters or waters
affected.
The current land owners, the Stevens, brought their
concerns to Reginald LaRosa, the Department of Water Resources,
and Environmental Engineering's operations chief. As a result,
LaRosa concluded the order had not required work done below the
low water mark and the state had no property interest.
In 1998, National Bank discovered the property was located on
filled land and reduced the units' appraised value. As such, it
commenced action against Vermont, seeking a declaration that the
public trust doctrine did not apply, or, alternatively, estopping
Vermont from asserting any interest in the property.
National Bank first argued the legislature had the power to
transfer public trust lands into private ownership free from state claim.
The court entertained the transfer idea but rather, required the state's
intent to abandon. The court ruled intent must be clearly expressed
or necessarily implied and statutes were interpreted in favor of
retaining public interest in tidelands. In the case at bar, the court
found no express or implied intent. The plaintiffs argued LaRosa's
declaration constituted Vermont's intent to hold no interest in the
condominium property. While LaRosa was in charge of managing the
State's public trust lands, the court ruled the legislature had not
delegated authority to LaRosa to abandon or convey into private
ownership all public trust lands.
Thus, National Bank alternatively argued Vermont was equitably
estopped from asserting the public-trust doctrine because the
diminished property values resulted in injustice, which required an
equitable remedy. However, the court found the injustice was not of
sufficient magnitude to justify estoppel. Thus, the court held the
equitable estoppel doctrine applicable to lands held in public trust.
Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed the superior court's decision.
Jon Hyman
WASHINGTON
Rothweiler v. Clark Cty., 29 P.3d 758 (Wash. App. 2001) (holding
Clark County did not have a duty to improve a drainage system, but
did have a duty to maintain the system's original efficiency; the County
was not liable for damages resulting from the system being
overwhelmed).
In June

1997, heavy rains overwhelmed a drainage system
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maintained by Clark County, Washington ("County"), resulting in the
flooding of the Rothweilers' home. Both parties agreed the flooding
resulted from an inadequate drainage system being overwhelmed by
extremely heavy rainfall. The Rothweilers sued the County for
negligence, negligent intrusion, nuisance, statutory nuisance, and
statutory negligence. The trial court granted the County's motion for
summary judgment, and the Rothweilers appealed.
On appeal, the County asserted both that a municipality had no
common law duty to drain surface water, and the common enemy
doctrine, which permits landowners the opportunity to dispose of
unwanted surface water with no liability for damages to one's neighbor
that may occur. However, this law has long been perceived as
inequitable by Washington courts, and as a result, exceptions to the no
duty rule have evolved. As such, the Rothweilers argued three
applicable exceptions.
The Rothweilers first sought relief under the "watercourse or
This exception asserts that a
natural drainway" exception.
municipality that dams a stream, gully, or natural drainway is not
shielded from the ensuing damage. However, the court found this
exception inapplicable because the drainage system the County
operated did not qualify as a natural drainway or watercourse. The
Rothweilers' second argument relied on the "collect and discharge"
This exception provides surface waters may not be
exception.
artificially collected and discharged on adjoining lands in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, the natural flow thereof.
However, the Rothweilers' expert witnesses were unable to support this
position with any material facts. Therefore, the court found there was
inadequate support for attempting to assert this exception. Finally,
the Rothweilers asserted the "due care" exception. This exception
requires landowners who alter surface water flow to act in good faith in
order to avoid unnecessary damage to others' property. However, the
County was able to successfully reject this assertion because the issue
did not involve a stream or natural drainway, nor does failing to drain
naturally accumulating water constitute altering the flow of surface
water.
The Rothweilers then attempted to attach liability for their
flooding damages by asserting that a municipality has a duty to
reasonably maintain its drains. This rule does not require a city to
modify its system over the passage of time. Rather, it requires a
positive duty to use reasonable care to maintain its original efficiency
once a city has adopted a particular plan. The County admitted the
drainage system was insufficient for handling the storm water that
flooded the Rothweilers' house. However, the County maintained it
was not liable for using an inadequate system because it was only
required to maintain the original efficiency of the system. As such, the
County produced evidence it had cleaned the drainage system six
months before the flooding. The Rothweilers were unable to produce
any evidence that the drain was clogged. Rather, evidence by both
parties reinforced the idea that the failure of the system was because of
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it being overwhelmed. The court thus held there was no duty for the
County to upgrade the system. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the lower court finding no duty to drain surface water, and
a duty only to maintain the drain system, not to improve it.
Michael Sheehan
Tapps Brewing, Inc. v. City of Sumner, 22 P.3d 280 (Wash. Ct. App.
2001) (holding city imposed General Facilities Charges, billing
property owners for city storm drainage system improvements, valid).
Tapps Brewing, Inc., Daniel, and Andrea McClung (collectively
"Tapps") appealed the trial court's denial of summary judgment.
Tapps had challenged the imposition of a General Facilities Charge
("GFC") the City of Sumner ("City") imposed in order to improve the
City's storm drainage system. Under the City's scheme, the GFC is
imposed upon the issuance of property improvement permits, and is
based on the amount of impervious surface on the developed
property.
Tapps applied for a development permit to remodel its property,
and was charged $9,950 as a storm drainage GFC. The McClungs
replaced an existent building and paved a parking lot. The storm
drainage pipe running through McClung's property was too small;
therefore, the City required the McClungs to replace the pipe with a
larger pipe as a condition of the development permit. The GFCs give
the City authority to construct "systems of sewerage" by "control[ing]
the rates and charges for their use." The court found the statutory
language clear and unambiguous in legally authorizing the City to
impose the instant GFCs.
Tapps first argued the GFC was invalid because the City's power to
impose fees on land development was limited and any city "charges
must be proportionate to the cost of the system attributable to the
property being charged." However, the Court found the charges
imposed did not meet this proportionality standard.
Tapps then argued the City had "unlawfully discriminated against
them by requiring them to pay more than other customers." They
claimed the charges were disproportionately applied, in violation of
the statutory uniformity standard. Nonetheless, the Court refused to
hear this issue as it was not raised as a stipulation, and therefore was
outside of the scope of the Court's discretionary review.
Anne Francis

